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Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism∗
Pekka Va¨yrynen
University of California, Davis
Abstract
The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is
non-inferential. This paper develops a qualified defense of intuitionism against
a recent objection, due to Nicholas Sturgeon: if ethical intuitionists accept a
certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their further com-
mitment to foundationalism leads them to an implausible epistemology outside
ethics. The good news is that, irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take
non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commit-
ment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism doesn’t commit them to
the existence of non-inferential knowledge in areas outside ethics (such as the
past, the future, or the unobservable) where its existence would be implausible.
The bad news is that our support for ethical intuitionism should for now remain
merely conditional, because each form of intuitionism requires a controversial
stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics.
1 Introduction
The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is
non-inferential. This epistemological doctrine doesn’t entail certain philosophical
∗Forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly. Thanks to Erik Johnson, Antti Kauppinen, Russ
Shafer-Landau, two anonymous referees for Philosophical Quarterly, and an anonymous referee for
another journal for useful comments. Also thanks to Brendan Jackson for helpful conversations.
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excesses that critics have often attributed to intuitionism, such as that we have
some dedicated faculty of ethical intuition or that beliefs based on ethical intuition
are infallible or self-guaranteeing.1 Nor does it require various other positions that
have often been often associated with the intuitionist tradition in moral philosophy,
such as a non-naturalist metaphysics of ethical facts and properties or irreducible
pluralism in axiology and normative ethics. Although much still remains to be done
in defense of ethical intuitionism, it has of late been getting a worse rap than it
deserves. This paper focuses on the recent objection that intuitionism implies an
implausible epistemology outside ethics. The good news is that the objection in
question fails to establish this. The bad news is that whether ethical intuitionism
implies a plausible epistemology within ethics depends on how we resolve certain
outstanding issues in other areas of philosophy.
2 The Standard Argument for Ethical Intuitionism
According to ethical intuitionism, some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential.
Speaking roughly, inferential knowledge is knowledge that is based on other things
one knows by reasonable inference. The nature of this ‘based on’ relation is a
complicated matter, but at minimum it marks some kind of positive dependence of
a belief’s status as knowledge on the factors from which the belief derives its status
as knowledge.2 In the case of inferential knowledge, these factors may be other
propositions that one knows or other beliefs one has (or has ‘available’) that count
as knowledge. Knowledge that p may then be a case of inferential knowledge even if
the psychological process that produced the belief wasn’t an actual inference, so long
1In what follows I’ll largely jettison the word ‘intuition’ altogether. Not only do different writers
use the word in quite different ways. From W. D. Ross onwards, many ethical intuitionists them-
selves have preferred to avoid using ‘intuition’ in expounding their theory because the word can be
misleading in various ways.
2For a distinction between positive and negative epistemic dependence, see e.g. Robert Audi,
The Structure Of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 144.
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as the belief’s status as knowledge positively depends on whether it is reasonably
inferable from other things one knows. (How to understand this idea depends on how
generously we understand the notion of inference. For example, would the reasonable
inferences have to be explicit if they were drawn, or could they be implicit?)
Accordingly, still speaking roughly, non-inferential knowledge is knowledge that
needn’t be based on reasonable inference from other supporting propositions or
beliefs that count as knowledge. (Of course, one might know some such supporting
propositions all the same. If p can be known non-inferentially, it doesn’t follow
that p cannot also be known inferentially. If there are ways other than reasonable
inference for knowledge that p to be based on other propositions or beliefs that count
as knowledge, then in those cases we can say that knowledge that p is ‘mediated’
by them if it comes, at least in part, from one’s knowledge of other propositions,
and ‘immediate’ otherwise.3 In this terminology, non-inferential knowledge would
be knowledge that doesn’t come even in part from other, supporting propositions
that one knows or the fact that one knows them. In what follows, however, I’ll
follow the targets of my discussion in sticking to the terms ‘inferential’ and ‘non-
inferential’ even though the terms ‘mediate’ and ‘immediate’ might on occasion be
more apt. We can give analogous rough characterizations of the notions of inferential
and non-inferential, and mediate and immediate, epistemic justification. In what
follows, however, I’ll often simplify by talking about knowledge even when it would
be more apt to talk about epistemic justification.) To make things a bit more
precise, I’ll take ethical intuitionism to require that ethical knowledge can be based
by some non-inferential mechanism on some kind of reasons or evidence, where such
non-doxastic states as experiences and phenomenal and intellectual appearances of
various sorts are typically taken to be capable of presenting the relevant kind of
reasons or evidence.
3For this terminology, see James Pryor, ‘Is There Immediate Justification?’, in Matthias Steup
and Ernest Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 181-
202, at p. 183.
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One reason to understand the core thesis of intuitionism – that some of our
ethical knowledge is non-inferential – along the above lines is that then intuitionism
purports to solve the skeptical regress problem for ethical knowledge.4 For if one
knows that p non-inferentially, then there is no further proposition that one must
know in order to know that p. This would stop the regress.
Another reason to understand ethical intuitionism in this way is that it reflects
an argument that has influenced most intuitionists and their critics alike. Under-
standing inferential and non-inferential knowledge as above, we can present this
‘standard argument’ for intuitionism as follows:
(S1) If we have any ethical knowledge, then such knowledge is either (a)
non-inferential, or (b) based on reasonable inference from partly
ethical premises, or (c) based on reasonable inference from entirely
non-ethical premises.
(S2) The Autonomy of Ethics: There is no reasonable inference (de-
ductive or non-deductive) to any ethical conclusion from entirely
non-ethical premises.
(S3) Therefore, if we have any ethical knowledge, then such knowledge is
either (a) non-inferential or (b) based on reasonable inference from
partly ethical premises.
(S4) Foundationalism: If we have any knowledge (a fortiori, any ethical
knowledge) that is inferential, then all such knowledge is ultimately
based on reasonable inference from some knowledge that is non-
inferential.
(S5) Therefore, if we have any ethical knowledge, then some of it is non-
inferential.
4I won’t here state the regress argument. The argument comes in many versions, but the
differences between them matter little to my present purposes. See e.g. Pryor, ‘Is There Immediate
Justification?’, p. 184.
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(S6) Ethical Non-Skepticism: We have some ethical knowledge.
(S7) Therefore, some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential.5
(S1) is a reasonable general assumption. (S2) entails that not all of our ethical
knowledge falls under clause (c) in (S1). So (S1) and (S2) jointly entail (S3). (S4),
which strictly speaking doesn’t exhaust foundationalism but only states a salient
implication of it, entails that not all of our ethical knowledge falls under clause (b)
in (S1). So (S3) and (S4) jointly entail (S5). Finally, (S5) and (S6) jointly entail
the core thesis of intuitionism in (S7). So the standard argument is valid.
The standard argument teaches us that if we combine foundationalism with the
autonomy of ethics, then we face a choice between skepticism and intuitionism about
ethics. We must also realize that the standard argument is valid independently of
the fact that it concerns ethics. A parallel argument concerning the future or the
unobservable would be equally valid. The argument therefore seems to generalize:
combining foundationalism with the autonomy of our thought about a given topic
forces a choice between intuitionism and skepticism about the topic in question.6
Since the standard argument is valid, any critic of ethical intuitionism must reject
at least one of its premises. Only skeptics about ethical knowledge reject (S6). (This
is a move I’ll bracket in this paper.) Given that (S1) is a reasonable assumption, any
non-skeptical critic of intuitionism must therefore reject either (S2) or (S4). But for
my present purposes we can simply set aside the familiar “cheap” counterexamples
to the autonomy of ethics and assume that (S2) is true. The objection to ethical
intuitionism that is my concern in this paper challenges foundationalism.
5This makes more explicit the argument as presented in Nicholas Sturgeon, ‘Ethical Intuitionism
and Ethical Naturalism’, in Philip Stratton-Lake (ed), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 184-211, at pp. 190-1. See also Roger Crisp, Reasons and the
Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 72.
6In this paragraph I follow the discussion in Sturgeon, pp. 197, 202.
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3 Intuitionism and the Autonomy of Ethics
The objection in question, which is due to Nicholas Sturgeon, is that we must
reject ethical intuitionism because, given a certain plausible general rationale for
the autonomy of ethics, its commitment to foundationalism leads intuitionism to an
implausible epistemology outside ethics.
Sturgeon offers a naturalistic ‘rationale’ for the autonomy of ethics. He notes
that ‘our thought about the natural world is highly populated by areas that are au-
tonomous with respect to the evidence we bring to bear on them’ (Sturgeon, p. 201).
We cannot reasonably infer, for instance, any conclusion about unobservables from
premises that are entirely about observables, or any conclusion about psychological
states solely from observations of behavior. This is because assessments of evidence
for theoretical conclusions are ’theory-dependent’. In deciding what to think, for
instance, about a conclusion concerning unobservables in the light of some observed
facts, we typically find ourselves having to rely not just on our understanding of the
observed facts and the conclusion but also on a large body of auxiliary assumptions
which will inevitably include some theoretical assumptions and some of which will
concern unobservables. The autonomy of many areas of our thought about the nat-
ural world is plausibly explained by how theory-dependence of this kind pervades
our reasoning in those areas. It is then plausible that the explanation for the auton-
omy of ethics is probably the same. Ethical intuitionists should agree, unless they
can give a good reason to think that the autonomy of ethics requires an exceptional
explanation. (Sturgeon, p. 201.)
Sturgeon then argues that this naturalistic rationale for the autonomy of ethics is
available to intuitionists only at a high epistemological cost. The rationale commits
us to the autonomy of our thought about the past, the future, the unobservable, the
psychological, and many other topics. As we saw, combining foundationalism with
the autonomy of our thought about a given topic forces a choice between intuitionism
and skepticism about the topic in question. So, unless an ethical intuitionist who
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accepts Sturgeon’s rationale for the autonomy of ethics is a skeptic about such
topics as the past, the future, the unobservable, and the psychological, she must be
an intuitionist about them, too. This commitment would be a cost because it is
‘not very plausible’ (Sturgeon, p. 202). It is doubtful that we have non-inferential
knowledge about the future or the unobservable, let alone that we have enough to
provide the needed basis for all the rest that we know in these areas, contrary to
foundationalism. So, if ethical intuitionists accept the autonomy of ethics on the
basis of Sturgeon’s rationale, then combining it with foundationalism commits them
to an implausible overall epistemology.7 But to give up foundationalism would be
to give up ethical intuitionism.
In short, Sturgeon’s main objection to the intuitionist view that some ethical
beliefs constitute knowledge independently of whether one can reasonably infer them
from other things one knows is that it implies an implausible epistemology outside
ethics. The objection is already powerful, but it can perhaps be made stronger still
by considering what beliefs count as inferentially acquired in the first place. We can
distinguish between narrower and broader notions of inference. One fairly narrow
notion is that a belief counts as being based on inference only if it is consciously
drawn from premises that are explicitly noted as evidence.8 One fairly broad notion
applies ‘to cases in which someone is unable to articulate the premises, and also to
7More precisely, Sturgeon (p. 204) argues that ethical intuitionism creates a disjunctive commit-
ment to either an implausible non-naturalist metaphysics within ethics or an implausible epistemol-
ogy outside it. This complication needn’t detain us, since I focus on the epistemological aspect of
the argument. Some ethical intuitionists themselves claim that an intuitionist moral epistemology
isn’t committed to a non-naturalist metaphysics of ethical properties. See Robert Audi, ‘Intuition-
ism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons
(eds), Moral Knowledge? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 101-36; and Audi, The
Good in the Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), at pp. 55, 232 n. 47. Indeed,
ethical intuitionism seems quite compatible with definitions of ethical naturalism like, for instance,
the one given in David Copp, ‘Why Naturalism?’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003), pp.
179-200.
8See Audi, The Good in the Right, p. 45.
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cases in which someone is unconscious of making an inference and perhaps even of
accepting the premises’ (Sturgeon, p. 209).
Those who endorse the autonomy of ethics tend to apply the doctrine in a way
that deploys some relatively broad notion of inference.9 For example, when someone
seems to move from purely non-ethical premises directly to an ethical conclusion,
we tend to think ‘What terrible reasoning!’ only when we think that we cannot
plausibly interpret the person as having in some or other way relied on some ethical
assumptions. Typically we think that those who make such an inference must in
fact be relying on, or have been influenced by, further ethical assumptions. But to
the extent that ethical intuitionists apply the autonomy of ethics in this familiar
manner, they are already committed to working with some relatively broad notion
of a belief’s being based on inference. If so, then the validity of the standard
argument for intuitionism requires that we interpret foundationalism in terms of a
correspondingly broad notion of inference. On such a notion, however, it would seem
quite plausible that those ethical beliefs that intuitionists would want to count as
non-inferential knowledge count as products of inference in a broad sense in which
a piece of reasoning might be unconscious or else not fully articulable. For analogy,
consider a psychologically immediate theoretical belief ‘There goes a proton’ that
a scientist might form upon observing a vapor trail in a cloud chamber. It seems
implausible that such a belief could ever count as non-inferential knowledge.10 This
would be to recruit considerations of how ethical intuitionists tend to apply the
9This paragraph canvasses the fuller discussion in Sturgeon, pp. 210-11.
10Sturgeon (pp. 202-3) cites epistemological similarities between physical and ethical ‘intuitions’
to support his claim about the ethical case. In this he follows Richard Boyd, ‘How to Be a Moral
Realist’, in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed), Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1988), pp. 181-228. The proton case is due to Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 6. For an argument that ethical intuitions aren’t
in general products of inference from background beliefs, part of which relies on the autonomy of
ethics, see Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), at pp.
103-4.
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autonomy of ethics in the service of putting further pressure on foundationalism.
More would need to be said fully to assess this addendum to Sturgeon’s main ob-
jection to ethical intuitionism. For instance, Sturgeon grants that any broad notion
of a belief’s being based on inference needs ultimately to be justified on the basis of
its role in a plausible epistemology and not merely by the above sort of dialectical
considerations (p. 209). We would need to determine just how broad a notion of
inference is required for applying the autonomy of ethics in the familiar manner. We
might think twice if it turned out that it requires a notion that counts, for instance,
ordinary perceptual beliefs as inferentially acquired if they are so much as acquired
within a framework of background theory. It might also turn out that intuitionists
have other vital philosophical interests that they can only protect by rejecting Stur-
geon’s broad notion of inference and those applications of the autonomy of ethics
which require such a notion.11 Hence rejecting broad notions of inference might be
the most obvious line of response for intuitionists to take.12 But whether there is
some fairly broad notion of a belief’s based on inference that would be epistemo-
logically well-motivated is too early to say. Hence in what follows I assume that a
‘yes’ answer to this question is a live possibility. What is more, Sturgeon’s main
argument against ethical intuitionism is independent of dialectical considerations
of how intuitionists tend to apply the autonomy of ethics. Even if some ethical
beliefs in fact aren’t inferentially acquired, the view that such a belief can count
as knowledge independently of whether it is reasonably inferable from other things
one knows might still lead to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. Sturgeon’s
main argument against intuitionism doesn’t therefore require the claim that the
11Audi refers to Sturgeon for ‘a quite different view of inference’ in the context of distinguishing
‘conclusions of inference’ from ‘conclusions of reflection’ (The Good in the Right, p. 210 n. 12 and
p. 45, respectively). (Cp. note 25 below.) This distinction matters here only to the extent that we
apply the autonomy of ethics in the familiar manner just to conclusions of reflection. Nothing that
Audi says settles the extent to which this is the case.
12Thanks to an anonymous referee for this journal for suggesting that I address this possible line
of response.
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ethical beliefs which intuitionists would want to count as non-inferential knowledge
are in fact based on inference.
4 Intuitionism and Ethical Perception
To begin assessing Sturgeon’s argument, let’s distinguish two forms of ethical intu-
itionism by their answers to the question, ‘Assuming we have ethical knowledge, how
do we have it?’ According to a posteriori ethical intuitionism, some of our ethical
knowledge is non-inferential a posteriori knowledge. According to a priori ethical
intuitionism, some of it is non-inferential a priori knowledge. (The core notion of
the a priori is that a proposition counts as being knowable a priori as long as no
positive appeal to experience is needed in order for it to be known, beyond whatever
experience one needs in order to understand it. This notion is minimal, in that it
allows us to treat a priori knowledge as defeasible by experience.13) Each version
finds adherents in the intuitionist tradition, often to the exclusion of the other. But
in fact they are compatible: it could be that we have both a priori and a posteriori
non-inferential ethical knowledge. (They do exhaust the intuitionist options, how-
ever, assuming that knowledge that isn’t a priori is a posteriori.) Let’s first consider
whether a posteriori ethical intuitionism can escape Sturgeon’s argument.
The standard way to understand a posteriori intuitionism is to model at least
some of our ethical knowledge on (quasi-)perceptual knowledge (where expressions
like ‘ethical perception’ and ‘moral vision’ needn’t be taken literally). If we have any
non-inferential a posteriori knowledge, presumably some of it is had by perception.
Similarly, it might be that we have at least some ethical knowledge by something
broadly like perception of ethical facts. (Since perception is of particulars, such
13See, among many others, Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998), ch. 4; Hartry Field, ‘Apriority as an Evaluative Notion’, in Paul
Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds), New Essays on the A Priori (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2000), pp. 117-49; and Copp.
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knowledge would presumably concern particular rather than general ethical facts.)
To make this more precise, one could say that one form of ethical cognition
is perception-like in that it involves exercising a conceptually and intellectually
sophisticated ability much like the ability to see that a person is in pain or amused,
or the ability to see that one can checkmate in five moves, or the ability to hear that
one of the pistons isn’t firing or that a chord is C# minor. Consider this famous
example from Gilbert Harman:
If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline
on a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are
doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you can see that
it is wrong.14
Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley suggest that knowing that what the hood-
lums are doing is wrong is like knowing that a particular wine is fine and that
knowing the latter is like knowing that a wine has a start of herbs and dark berries:
each can be known through exercising an acquired perceptual skill that is augmented
by intellect.15 If we think that tasting a start of herbs and dark berries is no less a
result of perceptual training than tasting fineness in wine, we might well think that
seeing that the hoodlums are torturing a cat for fun is no less a result of perceptual
training than seeing that their action is wrong. We might well think that in both
cases successful training improves our capacity to recognize qualities that reside in
the objects all along.16
The problem with this perceptual form of a posteriori intuitionism as we so far
14Harman, p. 4.
15See Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley, ‘Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral
Properties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002), pp. 75-85, at pp. 77-8.
16For similar claims, see David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), at p. 58;
Mark Johnston, ‘The Authority of Affect’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001),
pp. 181-214; and Terence Cuneo, ‘Reidian Moral Perception’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33
(2003), pp. 229-58.
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have it is that ‘seeing’ an action to be wrong might still be an inferential way of
knowing that it is wrong. Harman himself writes that ‘if you hold a moral view,
whether it is held consciously or unconsciously, you will be able to perceive rightness
or wrongness, goodness or badness, justice or injustice’ but that such observations
are ‘theory-laden’ in that ‘what you see depends to some extent on the theory
you hold’ (Harman, pp. 5, 4). Presumably trained perceptual abilities deliver
observations that are theory-laden in this way. But in that case ethical observations
that don’t require stopping to figure anything out may nonetheless always involve
inference in some broader sense of the term.17 (Given the autonomy of ethics,
these would likely be inferences among whose premises are some ethical views that
one already has.) This means that more or less everyone, not just oenological
intuitionists, can say that one way of knowing that a particular wine is fine is tasting
its fineness. And more or less everyone, not just ethical intuitionists, can say that
one way of knowing that the hoodlums’ action is wrong is seeing it to be wrong.18
By the same token, nothing in the perceptual form of a posteriori intuitionism as
we so far have it rules out the possibility that the ethical knowledge we have by
perception is nonetheless based, at least in part, by inference on other things we
know. Hence a posteriori intuitionists have yet to show that perception gives us
ethical knowledge that is non-inferential in some relevantly broad sense of inference.
Let ‘OTL’ be the claim that all observation is theory-laden. In responding to
Sturgeon’s objection, a posteriori intuitionists must first contest the claim that,
given OTL, none of one’s perceptual knowledge is based just on the experiences
that one has but rather is always based partly on reasonable inference from some
background beliefs one has. To get going, they might follow James Pryor in noting
that there are many senses in which observation might be theory-laden:
17For discussion, see Sturgeon, p. 205.
18For a discussion that reaches this kind of conclusion, albeit via a slightly different argument,
see Sarah McGrath, ‘Moral Knowledge by Perception’, Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004), pp.
209-28, at pp. 221-22.
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OTL1: What background beliefs one holds can causally affect what expe-
riences one has.
OTL2: One needs to have certain background beliefs before one is able even
to entertain or form certain observational beliefs.
OTL3: Background beliefs necessarily play a role in acquiring justification.
OTL4: Background beliefs can defeat any justification one gets from expe-
rience.19
A posteriori intuitionists can agree that ethical perception would be theory-laden in
the sense of OTL1 and OTL2. OTL1 concerns how one comes to have the experiences
one has in the first place, not about which transitions from experience to belief result
in justified belief or knowledge.20 Given OTL1, our prior ethical views can causally
affect what we perceive. This is compatible with having non-inferential ethical
knowledge by perceiving ethical facts. Similarly with OTL2. A non-inferentially
justified belief needn’t be a belief that one could be justified in holding without
needing to hold any other beliefs. One might need certain background beliefs to
possess the concepts necessary for even entertaining a given belief. But even when
this is so, it doesn’t follow that one’s justification for holding the belief must be
based even in part on whatever justification one has for holding those background
beliefs.21
OTL3 rules out the possibility of non-inferential perceptual knowledge and jus-
tification. OTL4 allows for defeasible non-inferential justification; whether it rules
19James Pryor, ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, Nouˆs 34 (2000), pp. 517-49, at pp. 540-1.
20As Pryor quips, your ‘sunglasses causally affect your experiences, but none of your perceptual
beliefs are justified to any extent by your sunglasses’ (‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, at p. 540).
21In this paragraph I largely follow Pryor, ‘The Skeptic and the Dogmatist’, pp. 533-4, 540-1.
Like him, I ignore the question whether, and how, we can draw a distinction between ‘observation’
and ‘theory’. That question deserves discussion, however, since it matters whether every ethical
belief is a theoretical belief (and in what sense). Sturgeon seems to think yes, whereas Audi thinks
not (‘Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’, p. 110).
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out non-inferential knowledge is a matter of dispute. But the above objection to
the perceptual form of a posteriori intuitionism doesn’t establish that ethical per-
ception is theory-laden in the sense of OTL3 or OTL4. (Harman’s claim that ‘what
you see depends to some extent on the theory you hold’ implies only OTL1.) The
objection is also compatible with the possibility that beliefs based on observations
that are theory-laden in the sense of OTL1 or OTL2 don’t depend for their status as
knowledge on inference even if their causal etiology involves unconscious inference.
Imagine, for example that you turn to me in a loud rock concert and I hear you
say ‘Awesome solo!’ Suppose I come to have such an experience only because my
brain merges auditory and facial movement signals into a unified experience (and
uses context and prior knowledge in other ways, too) to repair degraded sounds and
resolve ambiguities.22 (I didn’t hear you say ‘Oh, some solo!’) The process of ‘mul-
tisensory integration’ by which I come to have my speech perception then involves
inference in some fairly broad sense. But my knowledge that you said ‘Awesome
solo!’ could still be based directly on my experience and count as non-inferential in
the relevant sense. Likewise, many people think that I can know non-inferentially
that there are black marks on white surface in front of me on the basis of my visual
experience of black marks on white surface. The evidence on the basis of which I
know that you said ‘Awesome solo!’ or that there are black marks on white surface
in front of me isn’t distinct from my hearing you say ‘Awesome solo!’ or seeing black
marks on white surface.23
Following this model, a posteriori intuitionists could modify the perceptual ac-
count to hold that we have some ethical knowledge by perceiving ethical facts, where
this knowledge isn’t based on distinct evidence.24 The account implies that we have
22See e.g. Lee M. Miller and Mark D’Esposito, ‘Perceptual Fusion and Stimulus Coincidence in
the Cross-Modal Integration of Speech’, Journal of Neuroscience 25(25) (2005), pp. 5884-93.
23My formulation here reflects the view that evidence consists in some cognitive grasp of facts,
propositions, or ‘contents’. But I have no problem with the alternative view that evidence consists
in facts or propositions and it is having evidence that consists in some cognitive grasp of them.
24I take the expression ‘distinct evidence’ from McGrath, who defends the view that we ‘have
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some ethical knowledge by perceiving ethical facts which depends for its status as
knowledge neither on inference from distinct non-ethical evidence nor on inference
from prior ethical views and distinct non-ethical evidence.
Two friends of mine illustrate a worry about whether we have the kind of non-
inferential ethical knowledge that the modified perceptual account says we have.
Consider Greg, a wine maker who reports that in tasting wine he seeks for certain
non-evaluative qualities as a basis for judging whether the wine is fine. Compare
Greg with Michael, a wine connoisseur who reports that he can taste fineness in
wine. The modified account implies that when Greg and Michael both know that a
particular wine is fine, they know this in very different ways: Greg’s knowledge is
explicitly based on distinct premises that are noted as evidence whereas Michael’s
isn’t. But it would be surprising if their knowledge were so very different. It isn’t
because Greg is lacking in training, sensitivity, or discriminative ability that his
knowledge is based on non-evaluative evidence that the wine is fine. A critic like
Sturgeon might then suggest that Greg’s and Michael’s perceptual abilities aren’t
different in kind, but rather involve the same kinds of prior beliefs, expectations,
training, and inferences from certain sensory inputs to certain evaluative conclusions.
Greg and Michael might instead differ merely with respect to how explicit their
inferences are. Then Michael’s oenological knowledge would be no less inferential
than Greg’s in an epistemologically relevant sense.25
There is a reply to this worry. When, in Harman’s example, I experience what
moral knowledge by perceiving moral facts, and this perceptual knowledge does not rest on non-
moral evidence’ (p. 223). (She doesn’t say what counts as ‘resting on’.) For a related but more
detailed position, see John Greco, Putting Skeptics in their Place (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000), at pp. 241-44. Neither McGrath nor Greco endorses foundationalism, however,
since neither claims that all the rest of our ethical knowledge is based on perceptual ethical knowl-
edge.
25This case might also cast doubt on the epistemological, as opposed to psychological, relevance
of Audi’s distinction between ‘conclusions of reflection’ and ‘conclusions of inference’ (The Good in
the Right, pp. 45-6; cp. note 11.)
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the hoodlums are doing as wrong, my experience represents their action as being
wrong. Suppose for now that examples like this show that experiences can represent
ethical properties as being instantiated, so that if there are ethical properties that are
instantiated, then we can correctly represent them as being instantiated. (But note
that it is a substantive question whether experiences can represent ethical properties
in the same way that they represent colors, shapes, motion, and whatever else is
plausibly represented in experience.) The reply I have in mind is to say that at least
some experiences that correctly represent an ethical property as being instantiated
are perceptions of that ethical property as being instantiated. (The relevant sense
of ‘perceiving’ – and the corresponding sense of ‘seeing’ – is one where perceiving
is factive.) This isn’t a trivial move, although discussions of ethical perception
often make it without argument. Even if experiences can correctly represent that
properties of kind K are instantiated, these experiences fail to count as perception
unless their relation to what they represent is sufficiently direct. Thus, even if
experiences that represent properties such as colors, shapes, and motion count as
perceptions because in these cases the relation is sufficiently direct to count as
perception, a substantive question remains whether the same is the case with ethical
properties. (Parallel issues arise about whether experiences can represent causal
relations, whether one can perceive causal relations or whether all one can perceive
is a sequence of events minus its causal nature, and how direct the relation between
the two is.26)
This reply speaks to the issue at hand. If we couldn’t perceive ethical properties
as being instantiated, then those ethical beliefs that a posteriori intuitionists want
to count as non-inferential knowledge would have to be based on perceptions of
non-ethical properties. We couldn’t form ethical beliefs on the basis of perception
in any sense that requires ethical properties to be properly attributed to contents
26See Susanna Siegel, ‘The Contents of Perception’, in Edward N.
Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2005 Edition
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/perception-contents/), sec. 4.
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of perception. We could only do so in the sense in which I believe that my neighbor
is out of town on the basis of finding that her curtains are drawn, that her mailbox
is overstuffed, and that repeated ringings of her doorbell go unanswered.27 In that
case any ethical knowledge that we might have by perception would have to be
based at least in part on distinct non-ethical evidence. It seems, in other words,
that perception can give ethical knowledge that isn’t based on distinct evidence only
if we can perceive ethical properties as being instantiated.
The cost of the reply is that establishing that we can perceive ethical properties
as being instantiated is a tall order. We cannot establish this solely on the basis of
such phenomenological data as that in cases like Harman’s we seem to be ‘just seeing’
an action to be wrong. Such data alone don’t even suffice to establish that reports
like this are reports of perceptual experience. And everything we have said here so
far leaves open the possibility that our experiences represent ethical properties but
do so because we have experiences which represent certain non-ethical properties
and which we tend to process, more or less unconsciously, through our prior ethical
views and other background beliefs, expectations, and abilities that we have. Thus,
even if we analyze cases like Harman’s as involving experience that represents the
hoodlums’ action as wrong, what might be going on is that we infer, in some fairly
automatic fashion, that the action is wrong from an experience that represents the
hoodlums burning the cat or (more contentiously) causing the cat to suffer and die
plus our prior views concerning the wrongness of causing a sentient creature to suffer
and die. We cannot just assume that this kind of relation between our experiences
and the ethical facts they represent would be sufficiently direct for them to count
as perception. So, we cannot just assume that we can perceive ethical properties as
being instantiated.
Still, if we could perceive ethical properties as being instantiated, then a poste-
27This example is from Susanna Siegel, ‘Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?’, in
Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005), pp. 481-503, at p. 481.
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riori intuitionists could argue that some ethical knowledge is non-inferential even if
all observation is theory-laden in the sense of OTL1 and OTL2. To argue that the
relevant ethical beliefs don’t depend for their status as knowledge on inference, they
could argue that what properties we can perceive is partly a function of what con-
cepts, abilities, and training we possess. Could I not perceive that certain symbols
mean ‘That’s a load of rubbish’ even if someone who cannot read or doesn’t know
English couldn’t?28 Similarly, why couldn’t the various cognitive dispositions that
we have in virtue of our ethical training be among those that affect what properties
we can perceive? If they were, then, for instance, accepting a principle to the effect
that causing a sentient creature to suffer and die is wrong might well dispose me
to perceive such actions as wrong. Dispositions don’t seem to be the sort of things
on which one can rely as premises in inference. But this kind of relation between
experiences and what they represent might still be direct enough for them to count
as perception.
Of course, this cognitive psychology is speculative. But it is a relevant alternative
because Sturgeon’s case that ethical beliefs are products of inference isn’t empirical.
He notes that we need to explain why ‘the only people with physical intuition worth
trusting are those with extensive knowledge of highly sophisticated, approximately
true physical theory and lot of experience in applying it’ and why such beliefs ‘tend
to be most reliable when the background assumptions on which they rest are true’
(Sturgeon, p. 203). He then argues that these facts suggest that a belief such as
that there goes a proton, which a scientist might form upon observing a vapor trail
in a cloud chamber, must be based on inference if it is to count as knowledge. Since
ethical beliefs are essentially similar to such beliefs with respect to the conditions
under which they are reliable, we should treat the two in the same way.
The alternative that the a posteriori intuitionist offers is that we can perceive eth-
28For an argument, illustrated with an example involving Cyrillic characters, that which con-
cepts one possesses can causally influence what contents one’s experiences possess, see Christopher
Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 89.
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ical properties as being instantiated because our ethical background beliefs endow us
with cognitive dispositions to do so. If true, this would provide an epistemologically
well-motivated account of why perceptual ethical beliefs tend to be most reliable
when we have (at least approximately) true ethical background beliefs and why
some of them can nonetheless count as non-inferential knowledge. And yet if we can
perceive ethical properties as being instantiated, it doesn’t follow that in the similar
way perception also gives us non-inferential knowledge about topics like the past,
the future, or the unobservable. Whether we can perceive properties of a given kind
is something to settle largely on a case-by-case basis. Hence we also cannot assume
that a parallel defense of a posteriori intuitionism about extra-sensory perception
concerning the past, the future, or the unobservable would be equally plausible.
That view stands or (more likely) falls with the issue whether our experiences can
be sufficiently directly related to extra-sensory properties to count as perceptions
of such properties as being instantiated. (It may also be helpful to keep in mind
that Sturgeon is operating with a naturalistic rationale for the autonomy of ethics.
Extra-sensory perception would seem to make for a less easy fit with a naturalistic
view of the world than ethical intuitionism.)
To summarize: If we can perceive ethical properties as being instantiated, then
a posteriori intuitionists can explain how there can be non-inferential ethical knowl-
edge without thereby committing themselves to non-inferential knowledge in areas
outside ethics where the existence of such knowledge would be implausible. This
would undermine the kind of parity argument that Sturgeon runs against ethical
intuitionism. But the question remains whether it would commit a posteriori intu-
itionists to an implausible epistemology within ethics. That depends crucially on
what kinds of properties we can perceive as being instantiated and whether ethical
properties are among them. Nothing that is said here settles these outstanding ques-
tions in philosophy of perception. But so long as these questions remain unresolved,
our support for a posteriori intuitionism should be merely conditional.
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5 Intuitionism and Self-Evidence
According to a priori ethical intuitionism, some of our ethical knowledge is non-
inferential a priori knowledge. Most a priori intuitionists follow W. D. Ross in
holding that such knowledge would concern self-evident principles of prima facie
duty.29 Self-evidence is an epistemic property of a proposition that characterizes a
way of knowing it. A self-evident proposition is a truth any adequate understanding
of which is such that (a) one has justification for believing the proposition in virtue
of having that understanding of it and (b) if one believes the proposition on the
basis of that understanding, then one knows it.30 An adequate understanding of a
self-evident proposition needn’t depend on anything beyond itself for the knowledge
it can give of the proposition’s truth.
Many standard objections to a priori intuitionism fail because they construe the
notion of self-evidence more strongly than this. Even coming to understand, let
alone believe, a self-evident proposition may take time and serious reflection. A
proposition may then be self-evident even if its truth isn’t immediately evident or
even if some who understand it don’t believe it or find it obvious or compelling. Nor
does adequately understanding a self-evident proposition require grasping its modal
or epistemic status. For although self-evident propositions are a priori knowable,
believing such a proposition is consistent with not believing, of the proposition,
that it is self-evident, with believing that it isn’t self-evident, and with lacking the
concept of self-evidence. Hence various kinds of disagreement about whether some
given ethical propositions are self-evident don’t show that none exist. Likewise, even
29See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, ch. 2; Audi,
‘Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’ and The Good in the Right, ch. 2; and
Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), ch. 11.
For a form of a priori intuitionism which claims not to require that any moral truths be self-evident,
see Huemer, p. 106.
30I take this definition from Robert Audi, ‘Self-Evidence’, Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999),
pp. 205-28, at p. 206; and The Good in the Right, at pp. 48-9. Compare BonJour, p. 120.
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if self-evident propositions are necessary truths, believing one is consistent with not
believing that it is necessary. So the truth of a self-evident proposition could be
non-inferentially knowable even if knowledge of its modal and epistemic status were
inferential.31
What can defenders of this form of a priori intuitionism say in response to
Sturgeon’s objection to ethical intuitionism? There is an initial defensive move that
is independent of the claim that the ethical propositions which we can allegedly
know non-inferentially are self-evident. A priori intuitionists can complain that
both a posteriori intuitionists and Sturgeon model ethical beliefs too closely on
observation. Observation seems to be a poor model both for ethical judgments in
actual cases of trying to determine what one ought to do and for judgments about
hypothetical cases. We cannot know an action to be wrong by seeing it to be wrong
if no action which we could see to be wrong is yet on the scene. We cannot model
all ethical thought on spectator sports or arts. Moreover, Sturgeon’s paradigm case
of ethical intuition – seeing that what Harman’s hoodlums are doing is wrong –
concerns a particular ethical claim. But even if all particular ethical beliefs were
based on inference, it wouldn’t follow that all general ones (such as principles of
prima facie duty) are likewise based on inference. By the autonomy of ethics, they
cannot be reasonably inferred from purely non-ethical claims. It isn’t clear why
every general ethical claim would have to be reasonably inferable from some yet
further ethical claims. But if not, then why should every general ethical claim that
we know depend for its status as knowledge on whether that is the case?
Returning to self-evidence, a priori intuitionists can allow ample role for inference
in belief formation without compromising the possibility of non-inferential ethical
31For a fuller discussion of these replies, as well as other objections and replies, see Audi, ‘In-
tuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’ and The Good in the Right, ch. 2; Shafer-
Landau, pp. 250-65; and Philip Stratton-Lake, ‘Introduction’, in Philip Stratton-Lake (ed), Ethical
Intuitionism: Re-evaluations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 1-28, at pp. 18-23. See also
Huemer, ch. 5.
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knowledge. It is no problem if a proposition that is knowable solely on the basis of an
adequate understanding of it may be knowable also by inference from premises. It
is also no problem if being able adequately to understand a proposition may require
the capacity to draw inferences that serve to bring out the content of the proposition,
such as inferences concerning its application to cases. Since the inferences that one
must thereby be able to draw are inferences from rather than to a proposition,
the fact that coming to understand a self-evident proposition may involve inference
doesn’t show that believing it on the basis of understanding it is a product of
inference. Nor does it show that the belief depends for its status as knowledge on
inference from premises about the proposition’s implications.32
A priori intuitionists can also accommodate various versions of Sturgeon’s claim
that ethical beliefs are theory-laden much in the way that physical observations are.
They can accommodate an analogue of OTL2. We may indeed require certain back-
ground beliefs to understand a self-evident proposition. For example, understanding
the proposition that gleefully flogging an infant to death is (prima facie) wrong may
require theoretical beliefs about what pain and biological death are.33 So, on anal-
ogy with OTL2, being able to understand certain propositions may require having
certain background beliefs. But this doesn’t show that any belief that is based on
an adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition would have its status as
knowledge based on reasonable inference from those background beliefs.34 A priori
intuitionists can also accommodate an analogue of OTL4. Nowadays a priori in-
tuitionists tend to advocate accounts of the a priori which allow the possibility of
32See again the references listed in note 31.
33See Audi, ‘Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics’, p. 112; and Shafer-Landau,
p. 248.
34Certain background beliefs – such as theories that one holds about other, adjacent matters –
may likewise prevent the manifestation of the belief-forming dispositions that one has in virtue of an
adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition, thereby in effect ‘masking’ the manifestation
of those dispositions. For what can serve as an example of this, see Audi, ‘Intuitionism, Pluralism,
and the Foundations of Ethics’, pp. 127-28.
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having non-inferential ethical knowledge on the basis of adequate understanding of
certain propositions, without any further positive appeal to experience, even if ex-
perience, background beliefs, or inferences are capable of defeating our justification
to believe those propositions.35 Even if one adequately understands a self-evident
proposition, one may become subject to factors that render one’s understanding of
it inadequate or one may acquire stronger justification for believing an incompatible
proposition.36
The upshot here is that insofar as a priori intuitionism escapes objections to the
existence of self-evident ethical truths, it also escapes Sturgeon’s argument against
ethical intuitionism. The existence of self-evident ethical truths would explain how
non-inferential ethical knowledge is possible. But thinking that there are self-evident
ethical truths doesn’t commit one to the existence of self-evident truths also about
such topics as the past, the future, or the unobservable. Instead, whether there are
self-evident truths in a given area is something that will have to be settled largely on
a case-by-case basis. Ethical intuitionism carries no particular commitment in any of
these other cases. In sum, then, if there are self-evident ethical truths, then one can
accept both foundationalism and the autonomy of ethics without committing oneself
to self-evident truths in areas where the existence of non-inferential knowledge that
such truths can give would be implausible. A priori intuitionism isn’t therefore
committed to an implausible epistemology outside ethics.
Whether a priori intuitionism is committed, in virtue of its commitment to
self-evident ethical truths, to an implausible epistemology within ethics is a more
difficult question. Many intuitionists are able to offer at least some examples of eth-
ical propositions that seem true to a broad range of subjects once they think they
have understood the propositions in question but before they entertain arguments
for or against them. Examples might be that enjoyment is better than suffering,
35See again the references listed in note 13, as well as Audi, The Good in the Right, ch. 2; and
Huemer, ch. 5.
36See Audi, ‘Self-Evidence’, p. 219.
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that gleefully flogging an infant to death is pro tanto wrong, and that punishing
a person for a crime she didn’t commit is unjust. But it is unclear which of these
propositions make substantive ethical claims. Are suffering or punishment, for ex-
ample, concepts that yield substantive ethical claims? Unless there are substantive
ethical truths that are knowable a priori and non-inferentially, intuitionists will have
difficulty accounting for much of our ethical knowledge. We cannot reasonably in-
fer substantive ethical claims just from such non-substantive claims as ‘Murder is
wrong’.
I have also yet to see a reliable test for determining whether a proposition is
self-evident. Some ethical claims, such as perhaps the principles of equality that the
Declaration of Independence declares to be self-evident, may be such that it is hard
to know where to begin arguing for them. Instead we tend to make sure that those
who disagree have understood the claim and aren’t crazy. But such claims aren’t
supposed to exhaust the class of self-evident ethical propositions even by a priori
intuitionists’ own lights. We can also hardly assume that asking someone whether
a proposition seems true to her once she thinks she has understood it but before
she entertains arguments for or against it is a reliable test. Many propositions that
are false or at least require argument may nonetheless seem true to us owing to the
influence of such potentially distorting factors as partiality, prejudice, emotion, or
certain kinds of upbringing.37 A critic like Sturgeon could well also say that even
when we aren’t subject to distorting factors, our assessment of a given proposition
is often influenced, in a broadly inferential way, by our background beliefs.
Even if we have no reliable test for determining which propositions are substan-
tive self-evident ethical truths, such truths might exist all the same. Here I have
nothing new or significant to say for or against the arguments that intuitionists have
37CompareWalter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Moral IntuitionismMeets Empirical Psychology’, in Terry
Horgan and Mark Timmons (eds), Metaethics after Moore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp.
339-66; and Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ch. 9.
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given for their existence.38 But, in all fairness, since a priori ethical intuitionists
aren’t committed to the existence of substantive self-evident truths outside ethics,
Sturgeon’s argument doesn’t by itself show that no such truths exist in ethics. For
example, the naturalistic rationale that he offers for the autonomy of ethics is com-
patible with defeasible a priori ethical knowledge.39 Against a priori intuitionism,
then, Sturgeon’s objection is at the very least incomplete in an important respect.
A neglected worry remains, however, about the existence of substantive self-evident
ethical truths. It reprises old worries about the synthetic a priori.
Most of those who think that there are analytic truths would have no objection
to the claim that some analytic truths would be self-evident. But such apparently
analytic truths as that murder is wrong aren’t substantive. Substantive ethical
truths should be synthetic. Hence a priori ethical intuitionism requires that there
be self-evident synthetic ethical truths. But how is it supposed to be possible to
have justification to believe substantive synthetic ethical truths solely on the basis
of an adequate understanding of them? A priori intuitionists must explain how this
can be.
A priori intuitionists argue that there is no general problem with synthetic self-
evident truths by noting that on reflection such sentences as ‘Nothing is both green
and red all over’ seem a priori and self-evident but not analytic.40 But consider
the best-known contemporary account of analyticity, Paul Boghossian’s epistemic
account: ‘A statement is ‘true by virtue of its meaning’ provided that grasp of its
38See Ross, ch. 2; Shafer-Landau, ch. 11; Audi, The Good in the Right, ch. 2; Huemer, ch. 5;
and Crisp, ch. 3.
39For a form of ethical naturalism that is a case in point, see Copp.
40Audi says this after having argued that a self-evident truth may not be analytic in the sense
of being a truth that is ‘grounded in a simple containment relation of concepts’ (‘Self-Evidence’,
p. 222). Huemer says that the sentence in the text seems obvious on reflection although we have
no analytic definition of ‘red’ and ‘green’, let alone a derivation of the sentence from them (pp.
111-12).
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meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth’.41 This counts ‘Whatever
is red all over is not blue’ as analytic (Boghossian, p. 368). But now analyticity
is effectively equivalent to self-evidence. How can a priori intuitionists then hold
that we have some synthetic a priori knowledge in ethics based on an adequate
understanding of self-evident propositions? They appear to have three options: (1)
Argue that epistemically analytic claims can be relevantly substantive. (2) Argue
that the epistemic notion of analyticity is somehow ill-founded. (3) Argue that an
adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition may require more than grasp
of its meaning.
Option (1) is too weak if there is a purely semantic explanation of a sentence’s
being analytic in the epistemic sense. Boghossian thinks that there must be. For
‘something about the sentence’s meaning, or about the way that meaning is fixed,
must explain how its truth is knowable’ by ‘mere grasp of [its] meaning’ (Boghos-
sian, p. 366). Defending epistemic analyticity ‘requires showing only that certain
sentences are such that, if someone knows the relevant facts about their meaning,
then that person will be in a position to form a justified belief about their truth’
(Boghossian, p. 386). But simply knowing the relevant meaning-facts about sub-
stantive ethical propositions shouldn’t be sufficient for having justification to believe
them. Otherwise it is hard to see what role substantive ethical thought would play
in finding out moral truths.
Option (2) might help a priori intuitionism if epistemic analyticity had nothing in
particular to do with the slogan that analyticity is ‘truth in virtue of meaning’. We
might think that it won’t if the relevant meaning-facts needn’t be available to anyone
competent in the language, since in that case it could be that a truth is analytic
and yet not knowable by anyone who understands the proposition in question. For
example, Boghossian includes facts about how ‘meaning is fixed’ among the relevant
facts. But many terms (including terms that can figure in analytic truths) are such
41Paul Boghossian, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’, Nouˆs 30 (1996), pp. 360-91, at p. 363.
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that one may not be, just in virtue of being competent in the language, in a position
to know what fixes their meaning. This may be a reason to prefer an account of
analyticity which makes it possible that a truth is analytic but has no particularly
special epistemic status.42 On such an account, substantive self-evident ethical
truths could count as synthetic. But if a priori intuitionism rests on the rejection
of epistemic accounts of analyticity, fully assessing it requires that we first resolve
debates about analyticity in philosophy of language. We might also wonder what
more, or other, than knowing the relevant meaning-facts would need to go into an
adequate understanding of a proposition if the proposition were to have the kind of
special epistemic status that is characteristic of self-evidence.
Hence option (3). Robert Audi says that the relevant notion of adequate under-
standing implies “being able to apply [the proposition] to . . . an appropriately wide
range of cases, and being able to see some of its logical implications, to distinguish
it from a certain range of close relatives, and to comprehend its elements and some
of their relations”.43 But this account fails to make a sufficient difference. While
Boghossian doesn’t fully specify what knowing the relevant meaning-facts implies,
he claims that ‘at least some of an expression’s inferential liaisons are relevant to
fixing its meaning’ (Boghossian, p. 384). If that is right, then knowing the relevant
meaning-facts about a proposition requires being able to see some of its logical im-
plications, to distinguish it from a range of close relatives, and to comprehend its
elements and certain of their relations. How is adequate understanding then meant
to differ from grasp of the relevant meaning-facts? A priori intuitionists also still owe
us an account of what more than knowing the relevant meaning-facts an adequate
42For recent discussions of analyticity with this kind of thrust, see Brendan Jackson, Species of
Meanings: A Study of Semantic Kinds and Semantic Structure (PhD dissertation, Cornell Univer-
sity, 2005), ch. 2; and Gillian Russell, Truth in Virtue of Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming). See also Nathan Salmon, ‘Analyticity and Apriority’, Philosophical Perspectives 7
(1993), pp. 125-33, p. 130.
43Audi, ‘Self-Evidence’, at p. 208. See also the surrounding discussion and Audi, The Good in
the Right, p. 50.
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understanding of a proposition can require, if its truth is to be self -evident.
To summarize: If there are substantive self-evident ethical truths, then a priori
intuitionists can explain how there can be non-inferential ethical knowledge with-
out thereby committing themselves to non-inferential knowledge in areas where the
existence of such knowledge would be implausible. This would undermine the kind
of parity argument that Sturgeon runs against ethical intuitionism. But the ques-
tion remains how an ethical (or any other kind of) proposition can be such that
an adequate understanding of it puts one in a position to know that it is true but
facts about its meaning or how that meaning is fixed don’t alone explain why its
truth is knowable solely on the basis of an adequate understanding of it. Nothing
that is said here settles this outstanding question in philosophy of language. But so
long as the existence of synthetic self-evident ethical truths remains unresolved, our
support for a priori ethical intuitionism should be merely conditional.
6 Conclusion
Ethical intuitionism is the view that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential.
We have considered the following objection to this view: If ethical intuitionists ac-
cept the autonomy of ethics on the grounds that assessment of evidence is in general
theory-dependent, then their foundationalism about knowledge commits them to an
implausible epistemology outside ethics. I have explained how both a priori and a
posteriori ethical intuitionists can avoid an implausible epistemology outside ethics.
But in both cases I have also argued that whether these responses provide intuition-
ists with a plausible epistemology within ethics depends on how certain unsettled
issues in other areas of philosophy are resolved. The adequacy of a posteriori in-
tuitionism depends on an outstanding issue in philosophy of perception, that of a
priori intuitionism on one in philosophy of language. Which (if either) of these
forms of ethical intuitionism one should prefer depends on which (if either) of these
outstanding issues turns in favor of the philosophical commitments of each. I don’t
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know the answer to this question. Therefore I conclude that although ethical intu-
itionism escapes Sturgeon’s objection, our support for intuitionism should for now
remain merely conditional.
There are, of course, other recent objections to ethical intuitionism. For example,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues in great detail that we have no non-inferential
ethical knowledge because: (a) we know, from empirical research, that very many
ethical beliefs are partial, controversial, emotional, subject to illusion, or explicable
by an unreliable source; (b) any given ethical belief of ours can count as knowledge
only if we have reason to think that it is an exception to this general trend; but
(c) we can have reason to think that a given belief is exceptionally not subject to
distorting factors only if we are able to confirm the belief by inferring it from other
beliefs (such as beliefs to the effect that the belief has been formed in a reliable
way).44 I cannot here settle whether ethical intuitionists can answer this objection.
But I suggest that their responses will be subject to the same moral as I have drawn
about intuitionist responses to Sturgeon’s objection.
Ethical intuitionists allow that truths that can be known non-inferentially might
also be known on the basis of inference. Hence the force of Sinnott-Armstrong’s
objection depends on how plausible it is that if very many ethical beliefs are sub-
ject to distortion, then any ethical belief counts as knowledge only when, and to
that extent because, the believer is able to confirm that belief by inferring it from
other beliefs. (Only when the belief derives its status as knowledge at least in part
from the believer’s having this inferential ability.) The truth of this claim is a gen-
eral epistemological problem that has nothing special to do with ethical knowledge.
Relevant to its solution are such issues as how, in general, a significant chance of
44See Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Moral Relativity and Intuitionism’, Philosophical Issues 12 (2002),
pp. 305-28; ‘Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology’; and Moral Skepticisms, ch. 9. For
an intuitionist response, see Russ Shafer-Landau, ‘A Defense of Ethical Intuitionism’, in Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong (ed), Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The Cognitive Science of Morality (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming).
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the presence of epistemic defeaters bears on justification and knowledge, and how
plausible certain general higher-order requirements on epistemic justification and
knowledge are. The problem also bears on the philosophical force of those epistemic
principles, favored by many contemporary foundationalists, according to which it is
prima facie rationally permissible to assume that things are the way they appear.45
Any solution to the problem will imply a stand on these general epistemological
issues. We might also wonder whether an argument against intuitionism that has
nothing special to do with ethics would generalize to support a more global skepti-
cism. Might it show that no source of belief is a source of knowledge unless we have
reason to trust the kind of beliefs in question?
I suspect, then, that any response to Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection to ethical
intuitionism will carry specific commitments in outstanding issues in general epis-
temology. If that is right, then our support for ethical intuitionism should for now
remain merely conditional in this respect as well. The moral I draw is that in order
fully to assess ethical intuitionism we must take a thorough account of various issues
in other areas of philosophy – not only in epistemology, but also in philosophy of
mind and language, and beyond. Our support for ethical intuitionism should ac-
cordingly remain conditional on how the relevant outstanding issues in these other
areas are resolved. Thus ethical intuitionism depends for its viability less on any-
thing special about ethics than on more general philosophical considerations. In this
respect, at least, ethical intuitionism seems to be no different from other accounts
of ethical knowledge that are currently on offer.
45Among those who endorse such principles are Huemer, p. 99; and Pryor, ‘The Skeptic and the
Dogmatist’.
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